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Governance in India’s Public Transport Systems - Comparing Indian Railways and Airlines

Author

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  • Ashima Goyal

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

Abstract

The paper examines the basic reasons and feasible remedies for organizational weakness, and the possible contribution of ownership, industry and management structure, leadership, social norms, and institutional incentives to alleviating the weaknesses in the Indian context. The arguments are illustrated with reference to the public rail and air services and help to understand why some public sector transport undertakings performed better than others. The most effective changes are those that create incentives, broadly defined, for individuals to improve productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashima Goyal, 2007. "Governance in India’s Public Transport Systems - Comparing Indian Railways and Airlines," Microeconomics Working Papers 22402, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:eab:microe:22402
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    File URL: http://www.eaber.org/node/22402
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12332 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2002. "The Economics of Contracts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814904.
    4. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    5. Goyal, Ashima, 2004. "Getting water from public private partnerships," MPRA Paper 27788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2002. "The Economics of Contracts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521893138.
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    8. Laffont,Jean-Jacques, 2005. "Regulation and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521840187, January.
    9. Goyal, Ashima, 1999. "The Political Economy of the Revenue Deficit," MPRA Paper 29980, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public services; Governance; social norms; incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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