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Fiscal Decentralization and Local Public Good Provision in China

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Author Info
Xin-Qiao () (China Center of Economic Research, Peking University)
Jie Bai (China Center of Economic Research, Peking University)
Abstract

Fiscal incentive is closely related with the extra-budgetary revenues. Based on our definition of fiscal incentive, we explore the impacts of fiscal incentives under decentralization on responsiveness of public good provision to real local needs. There are also some problems in fiscal decentralization in China: first, with a huge basis of extra-budgetary revenue, the size of local government would be expanded, resulting in a heavier burden on the shoulder of local citizens and peasants; second, there exist some decreasing return to scale in local extra-budgetary expenditure; thirdly, ¡°urbanization¡± (measured as the ratio of rural population to the total population) is negatively correlated with the local extra-budgetary expenditure on urban maintenance, indicating that in China, the process of industrialization and urban construction are not consistent.

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File URL: http://www.eaber.org/intranet/documents/39/657/CCER_Ping_05.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Macroeconomics Working Papers with number 657.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eab:macroe:657

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Related research
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization; Local Public Good Provision; Fiscal Incentives;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Berkowitz, Daniel & Li, Wei, 2000. "Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 369-397, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Zhang, Xiaobo & Fan, Shenggen & Zhang, Linxiu & Huang, Jikun, 2004. "Local governance and public goods provision in rural China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2857-2871, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Faguet, Jean-Paul, 2004. "Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs?: Evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 867-893, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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