Should Australia Encourage Developing Countries to Adopt Competition Laws?
AbstractRequiring developing countries to adopt competition laws has become a standard element in Free Trade Agreements between those countries and developed countries, and in the check list of measures sought by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. However, there is little reason to think competition policy will increase welfare in those countries, especially as its proper implementation requires institutional capabilities that most developing countries lack. Despite this, the ASEAN countries, along with many other developing countries, have adopted competition policies that mirror all the prohibitions typically found in developed countries. It is suggested that it would be preferable were those prohibitions dropped, and competition policy refocussed on to a narrower set of instruments and objectives.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Macroeconomics Working Papers with number 22307.
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: JG Crawford Building #13, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, ACT 0200
Web page: http://www.eaber.org
More information through EDIRC
ASEAN; Australia; Competition Law; Antitrust Law;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ernst Schaumburg & Andrea Tambalotti, 2003.
"An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy,"
- Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
- Andrea Tambalotti & Ernst Schaumburg, 2004. "An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 282, Econometric Society.
- Ernst Schaumburg & Andrea Tambalotti, 2003. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Staff Reports 171, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Sproul, Michael F, 1993. "Antitrust and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 741-54, August.
- Damien J. Neven, 2006. "Competition economics and antitrust in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 21(48), pages 741-791, October.
- Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999.
"Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer.
- Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007.
"Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
- Lafontaine, Francine & Slade, Margaret, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries : The Evidence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 799, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-76, August.
- Crandall, Robert W. & Winston, Clifford, 2004.
"Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence,"
- Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2003. "Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 3-26, Fall.
- Sjostrom William, 2004. "Ocean Shipping Cartels: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 1-28, June.
- Francois Melese, 1999. "Winners, losers and Microsoft: competition and antitrust in high technology, by Liebowitz, S.J. and Margolis, S.E. Foreword by Jack Hirshleifer. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute, 1999, xiv+," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(8), pages 447-448.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
- Fisher, Franklin M. & McGowan, John J. & Greenwood, Joen E., 1985. "Folded, spindled, and mutilated: Economic analysis and U.S. v. IBM," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 81-87.
- (Special Paper), 1997. "Programme and Proceedings of 1997 Warwick Summer Research workshop on "Dynamic Games and their Economic Applications"," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 488, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- David Encaoua & Bernard Franck, 1980. "Performances sectorielles et groupes de sociétés," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 31(3), pages 397-429.
- Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shiro Armstrong).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.