The extent to which remuneration systems affect the behaviour of health care professionals is of considerable importance in the administration of publicly funded heath care systems. Using data across two jurisdictions in the United Kingdom, in only one of which remuneration was changed, we compare the extent of measured dental activity at the dentist level in order to ascertain the impact of moving to activity-based remuneration. We find that there are large and statistically significant increases in activity as dentists moved to the activity-based system and that a dentist’s previous form of contract is an important determinant of the magnitude of the effect. We also explore the extent to which dentists’ professional attitudes can explain differences in their activity and find that some aspects of self-reported attitudes are associated with observable differences in activity.
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Paper provided by University of Dundee, Economic Studies in its series Discussion Papers with number
217.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2000.
"Government purchasing of health services,"
Handbook of Health Economics,
in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 847-890
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
McGuire, Thomas G., 2000.
"Physician agency,"
Handbook of Health Economics,
in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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