Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending
AbstractThis paper presents direct evidence for self-enforcing dynamic contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a "punishment" effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities. Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default, a feature that characterizes dynamic contracts. Using data on bank loans to developing countries between 1973-1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-06.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics Duke University 213 Social Sciences Building Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://econ.duke.edu/
reputation; dynamic contracts; sovereign bank loan spreads; rational expectations; default risk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Guido Sandleris, 2012. "The Costs of Sovereign Defaults:Theory and Empirical Evidence," Business School Working Papers 2012-02, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics Webmaster).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.