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Trade Protectionism

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Author Info
Kaempfer, William H.
Tower, Edward
Willett, Thomas D.

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Abstract

This paper is a short, non-technical exposition of the political economy of protection. It asks how do political forces operate to generate protection, and what determines the magnitude and form that protection takes.

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File URL: http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Abstracts02/abstract.02.20.html
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 02-20.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Publication status: Forthcoming in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE, edited by Charles K. Rowley.
Handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:02-20

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Postal: Department of Economics Duke University 213 Social Sciences Building Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://www.econ.duke.edu/

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Related research
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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  1. Ryan Gibbs & Omer Gokcekus & Edward Tower, 2002. "Is Talk Cheap?," Journal of Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 127-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Michael Hoffman, 2005. "Discretion, Lobbying, and Political Influence in Models of Trade Policy," Journal of Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 175-188, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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