The purpose of the article is to analyse the consequences of the constraint of shareholder value on the wage level and equilibrium unemployment rate. We will relate the new program of maximization of the firm, as well as the one of the trade union. We obtain an increase of the unemployment rate when progressing from a maximization of profit to a maximization of the EVA. The unemployment rate is also now depending on others financial variables.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number
2007-15.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: