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Within and Between Group Variation of Individual Strategies in Common Pool Resources: Evidence from Field Experiments

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Author Info
Maria Alejandra Velez () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
James J. Murphy () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
John K. Stranlund () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)

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Abstract

With data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted with artisanal fishing communities in Colombia, we estimate a hierarchical linear model to investigate within-group and between-group variation in individual harvest strategies across several institutions. Our results suggest that communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but that these coordinated strategies vary considerably across groups. In contrast, weakly enforced regulatory restrictions on individual harvests (as well as unregulated open access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006-4.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dre:wpaper:2006-4

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Related research
Keywords: common pool resources; field experiments; communication; regulation; hierarchical linear models;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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  1. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2002. "Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 379-395, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur, 1996. "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 817-45, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Juan Camilo Cardenas & T. K. Ahn & Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "Communication and Co-operation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: A Field Experiment," Artefactual Field Experiments 0027, The Field Experiments Website.
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  6. Brosig, Jeannette, 2002. "Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 275-290, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Casari, Marco & Plott, Charles R., 2003. "Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 217-247, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Rachel T. A. Croson, 2007. "Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 199-216, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kent D. Messer & Todd M. Schmit & Harry M. Kaiser, 2005. "Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 1046-1060, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu, 2004. "Non-excludable public good experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 81-102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Brandts, Jordi & Schram, Arthur, 2001. "Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 399-427, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  16. Messer, Kent & Schmit, Todd & Kaiser, Harry, 2005. "Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19130, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
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