Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Adverse Selection in Clubs and the Demand for Nondiscriminatory Equal Access Policies vs. Quotas

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mumy, G-E
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Because of very concrete knowledge of race and sex discrimination, a particularly important class of peer group effects arise when agents of one type want to associate with agents of another type, while agents of that other type prefer association among themselves. Competitive provision in the presence of this king of peer group effect is the focus of this paper. Charges of unfair pricing and access limitation have often been met by governmental policies banning price discrimination between types and exclusionary restrictions. The purpose of this paper is to analyze explicitly the characteristics of competitive equilibria that might emerge under these kinds of policy controls, and the extent to which these equilibria can generate demands for inclusionary quotas.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0429.

    as in new window
    Length: 28 pages
    Date of creation: 1996
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0429

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
    Fax: 81-6-6879-8583
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: MINORITY GROUPS ; PRICING ; GOVERNMENT POLICY;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0429. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.