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Does Centralised Bargaining Reduce Individual Effort?

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  • Brunello, G

Abstract

This paper looks at the relationship between centralisation of the wage bargain and individual effort when the effort elicitation mechanism is provided by intra-firm, rather tha inter firm, wage differentials.

Suggested Citation

  • Brunello, G, 1996. "Does Centralised Bargaining Reduce Individual Effort?," ISER Discussion Paper 0426, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0426
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    2. Richard B. Freeman & Robert S. Gibbons, 1995. "Getting Together and Breaking Apart: The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining," NBER Chapters, in: Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, pages 345-370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Haskel, Jonathan & Martin, Christopher, 1992. "Margins, concentration, unions and the business cycle : Theory and evidence for Britain," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 611-632, December.
    4. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-580, June.
    5. Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1993. "Hierarchies and compensation: A case study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 366-378, April.
    6. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    7. Sampson, Anthony A., 1993. "Bargaining over effort and the monitoring role of unions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 371-381, August.
    8. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Union Wage Policy: The Importance of Labour Mobility and the Degree of Centralization," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(230), pages 139-153, May.
    9. Brunello, Giorgio, 1994. " Incentives, Bargaining and the Wage Structure," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 481-497.
    10. Malcomson, James M, 1984. "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 486-507, June.
    11. Lars Calmfors, 1993. "Centralisation of Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 131, OECD Publishing.
    12. Moene, Karl O, 1988. "Unions' Threats and Wage Determination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 471-483, June.
    13. Hoel, Michael, 1990. " Local versus Central Wage Bargaining with Endogenous Investments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(3), pages 453-469.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    BARGAINING ; WAGE SCALE;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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