Shadow-Pricing Interpretation of the Pigovian Rule for the Optimal Provision of Public Goods
AbstractThe Pigovian rule for the optimal public goods provision with distortionary taxation is given a new interpretation. It relates the Pigovian rule to project evaluation rules in terms of shadow prices discussed by Diewert (1983) and Hammond (1986). Our formula for the Pigovian rule is compared with that given by Wildasin (1979) for cases in which indirect taxes are set optimally. The approach introduced in teh present study provides a clear interpretation of Widsasin's result.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0297r.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
PRICING ; PUBLIC GOODS;
Other versions of this item:
- Tsuneki, A., 1993. "Shadow-Pricing Interpretation of the Pigovian Rule for the Optimal Provision of Public Goods," ISER Discussion Paper 0297, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
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