Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality
AbstractIn markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets first originate. We consider a market in which sellers make observable investment decisions to enter a market in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry has the tendency to lower prices, which may lead to adverse selection. The implied price collapse limits the amount of entry so that high prices are sustained in equilibrium, which results in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about product quality may instead be characterized by above normal profits even in markets with low measures of concentration and less entry than would be expected.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Justice, Antitrust Division in its series EAG Discussions Papers with number 201206.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
adverse selection; asymmetric information; quality; experience goods; cre- dence goods; entry; entry barriers;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-08-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2012-08-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2012-08-23 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2012-08-23 (Microeconomics)
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