Under the new Basle Capital Accords, regulation takes the form of a contingency rule prescribing a certain level of bank capital contingent on the bank's risk taking behaviour in choosing its asset portfolio. In a simple dynamic model of banking with binding regulation we show that such Basle II regulation is Pareto inferior to regulation by a fixed capital requirement if and only if some condition on elasticities is satisfied. We provide a simple example to illustrate our findings.
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