The role of fiscal policy in EMU: a simulation with EUROMON
AbstractCountry members of EMU as well as the United States have improved their fiscal positions during the course of the past decade. This article considers the impact of further government debt and deficit reductions in the EMU area. First the literature on government finance establishing the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic management is reviewed. Next some empirical simulations using the macroeconometric multi-country model EUROMON of the Nederlandsche Bank are carried out. With these it is investigated what countries would have to incur if they were to improve their fiscal positions further and more generally, what is the role of fiscal policy in the context of the single currency. This discussion focusses on how countries' fiscal policy can affect first each other and second, general price stability. Finally, a US simulation is presented that shows the possible impact of a further improvement of the US fiscal position as recently projected by the Congressional Budget Office, on the eurozone.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) with number 653.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
fiscal policy; price stability; EMU; EUROMON;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1998.
"The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1009-25, July.
- Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1996. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," CEPR Discussion Papers 1473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel & Andrew K. Rose, 1996. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," NBER Working Papers 5700, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2004.
"An independent central bank faced with elected governments,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 907-922, November.
- Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1999. "An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 2002.
"An Empirical Characterization Of The Dynamic Effects Of Changes In Government Spending And Taxes On Output,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1329-1368, November.
- Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output," NBER Working Papers 7269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hughes Hallett, A J & Vines, D, 1993. "On the Possible Costs of European Monetary Union," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 61(1), pages 35-64, March.
- Elmendorf, Douglas W. & Gregory Mankiw, N., 1999.
Handbook of Macroeconomics,
in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 25, pages 1615-1669
- Elmendorf, Douglas W. & Mankiw, N, 1999. "Government Debt," Scholarly Articles 2643866, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1998. "Government debt," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1998. "Government Debt," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1820, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1998. "Government Debt," NBER Working Papers 6470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bayoumi, Tamim & Eichengreen, Barry, 1992.
"Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen., 1992. "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification," Economics Working Papers 92-187, University of California at Berkeley.
- Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1992. "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification," NBER Working Papers 3949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991.
"Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States,"
NBER Working Papers
3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Fiscal Policy In Good Times And Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1399-1436, November.
- John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rob Vet).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.