Monetary policy and fiscal discipline in the EMU: a game-theoretic analysis of the Stability Pact
AbstractIn this report a formal game-theoretic framework is presented to analyse the effects of the Stability Pact on monetary policy in the EMU. First, the model shows that high deficits and government debt lead to excessive inflation, causing a rise in interest rates. Second, the analysis confirms the notion that the Stability Pact has a dampening effect on inflation, depending on the severity of the sanctions. Moreover, the analysis gives support to the much debated policy goal of 'close to balance or in surplus', concerning the deficit/GDP ratio. Finally, the model can also give insight in the relation between the economic independence of the ECB and the effectivity of the Stability Pact.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) with number 529.
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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- W. Bolt, 1999. "Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility and the Stability Pact:A Game-Theoretic Perspective," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 38, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Matteo Governatori & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2004.
"Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1354, CESifo Group Munich.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Governatori, M., 2004. "Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-143035, Tilburg University.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Governatori, Matteo, 2004. "Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 4647, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard Hule & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 25-38, March.
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