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Double Discretion, International Spillovers and the WelfareImplications of Monetary Unification

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Author Info
P.A.D. Cavelaars
Abstract

This paper studies the welfare consequences of the monetary union in Europe. Its workhorse is a monetary-fiscal game which stresses the importance of international spillovers and introduces a double (monetary and fiscal) credibility problem. It is shown that the welfare impact of EMU is ambiguous for Europe, but that EMU is unambiguously welfare-improving for the US.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank in its series DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) with number 85.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:staffs:85

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Related research
Keywords: monetary union; commitment; spillovers; welfare analysis.;

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  1. Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1995. "Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Martin, Philippe, 1997. "The Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro: A Matter of Size?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1646, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1997. "How Will Transatlantic Policy Interactions Change with the Advent of EMU?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen., 1992. "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification," Economics Working Papers 92-187, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Agnes Benassy-Quere & Benoit Mojon & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 1997. "The Euro and Exchange Rate Stability," Working Papers 1997-12, CEPII research center. [Downloadable!]
  6. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J., 1996. "The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility," Research Memoranda 005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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