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Banking competition, risk and regulation

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Author Info
W. Bolt
A.F. Tieman

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Abstract

In a dynamic framework banks compete for customers by setting lending conditions for the loans they supply, taking into account the capital adequacy requirements posed by the regulator. By easing its lend- ing conditions a bank faces a tradeoff between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per-period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead commercial banks to set more stringent loan conditions to their customers, and we show that increased competition in the banking in- dustry leads banks to behave more risky. In this model we also look at risk-adjusted capital requirements and show that risk-based regulation is effective. We extend the basic model to have banks choose both their lending conditions and the level of bank capital. In this extended model it turns out that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though equity is more expensive than attracting deposits. We show that the same conclusions with respect to the effectiveness of regulation hold as in the standard model.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank in its series DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) with number 70.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dnb:staffs:70

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Related research
Keywords: Banking competition; risk profile; failure rate; capital requirements;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. repec:fth:bfdipa:21/00 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1991. "The capital crunch: neither a borrower nor a lender be," Working Papers 91-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. P.J.G. Vlaar, 2000. "Capital requirements and competition in the banking industry," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 634, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Jokivuolle, Esa & Kauko, Karlo, 2001. "The New Basel Accord: some potential implications of the new standards for credit risk," Research Discussion Papers 2/2001, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  6. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-43, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Perotti, Enrico C. & Suarez, Javier, 2002. "Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1599-1622, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937.
  9. Peter J.G. Vlaar, 2000. "Capital requirements and competition in banking industry," Working Paper Series WP-00-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  10. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Ezra Friedman & Robert Marquez, 1999. "Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 515-534, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Cordella, Tito & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, 1998. "Public Disclosure and Bank Failures," CEPR Discussion Papers 1886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1998. "The Economics of Bank Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(4), pages 745-70, November.
    Other versions:
  13. Stephen F. LeRoy, 1990. "Mutual deposit insurance," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun 8. [Downloadable!]
  14. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2006. "The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy," 2006 Meeting Papers 512, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
  15. repec:fth:bfdipa:2/2001 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Chu, Kam Hon, 1999. "Free Banking and Information Asymmetry," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(4), pages 748-62, November.
  17. C. H. Furfine, 2000. "Evidence on the response of US banks to changes in capital requirements," BIS Working Papers 88, Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Philipp Hartmann & Elena Carletti, 2002. "Competition and stability: what's special about banking?," Working Paper Series 146, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Wilko Bolt & Alexander Tieman, 2005. "On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting," DNB Working Papers 070, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. A.F. Tieman, 2003. "Spillover of Domestic Regulation to Emerging Markets," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 90, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Sophocles N. Brissimis & Manthos D. Delis & Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou, 2008. "Exploring the Nexus between Banking Sector Reform and Performance: Evidence from Newly Acceded EU Countries," Working Papers 73, Bank of Greece. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Goetz von Peter, 2004. "Asset Prices and Banking Distress: A Macroeconomic Approach," Finance 0411034, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Alexander F. Tieman & Daniel C. L. Hardy, 2008. "Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth," IMF Working Papers 08/188, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. W. Bolt & A.F. Tieman, 2001. "When Basle II doesn't work: Contingency Rules versus Fixed Requirements," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 681, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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