Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility and the Stability Pact:A Game-Theoretic Perspective
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank in its series DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) with number 38.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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