On the Influence of capital Requirements on Competition and Risk taking in Banking
AbstractThis paper focuses on the interaction between regulation and competition in an industrial organisation model. We analyse how capital requirements a.ect the pro.tability of two banks that compete as Cournot duopolists on a market for loans. Bank management of both banks choose optimal levels of loans provided, equity ratio and e.ort to reduce loan losses so as to maximise pro.ts. It is shown that the introduction of a just binding capital constraint improves the pro.tability of the constrained bank, whereas the pro.tability of its unrestricted competitor declines. Especially, if an ine.cient bank chooses a strategy that might result in bankruptcy, capital requirements are welfare improving. However, also under conditions that both banks would also never default in the absence of regulation, mild capital requirements can be bene.cial as they stimulate banks to provide more loans. Too high requirements on the other hand relatively favour the ine.cient bank, and result in welfare losses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank in its series DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) with number 102.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Cournot duopoly; Capital requirements; Pro?t paradox;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-03-14 (All new papers)
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