Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank
AbstractCentral banks do not operate in a vacuum. In this paper we analyse the factors leading to external pressure or public support for European monetary policy. Moreover, based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, some additional lessons are drawn for the ECB. External pressure on the ECB mainly stems from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly try to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat for governments to lose their majority in the next election. This latter source of pressure is, however, likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department in its series MEB Series (discontinued) with number 2002-18.
Date of creation: Sep 2002
Date of revision:
European Central Bank; Bundesbank; External Pressure; Public Support;
Other versions of this item:
- Philipp Maier & Saskia Bezoen, 2002. "Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank," Macroeconomics 0209001, EconWPA.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-08-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2003-08-17 (Central Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2003-08-17 (European Economics)
- NEP-MON-2003-08-17 (Monetary Economics)
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