Commission Bans and the Source and Quality of Financial Advice
AbstractIn the wake of the financial crisis, several countries are to ban commission payments to improve the quality of financial advice. This paper investigates the potential impact of commission bans on the source and quality of financial advice. To this end, we extend Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012) framework by allowing for both direct and intermediary advice. Our extended model has a unique separating equilibrium where customers that are naÃ¯ve about conflicts of interests prefer direct advice to intermediary advice, though the latter is of better quality. Alert customers rationally prefer intermediary advice. Accordingly, the welfare benefits from commissions bans may be limited in practice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 350.
Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision:
information provision; conflicts of interests; commission bans; distribution channel; consumer financial protection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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08-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2009. "Misselling through Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 883-908, June.
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