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Card acceptance and surcharging: the role of costs and competition

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  • Nicole Jonker

Abstract

The payment cards market is a two-sided market. Cost sensitivity of both consumers and merchants for card services influences total demand. Survey data of Dutch merchants shows that costs, and competition affect acceptance as well as surcharging decisions. Merchants who find payment cards expensive are less likely to accept them and more likely to surcharge their customers for using them. Merchants who face any competition accept debit card payments relatively more often than merchants with monopoly power, and they are less likely to surcharge their customers for debit card usage. Intense competition leads to higher credit card acceptance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 300.

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Date of creation: May 2011
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:300

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Keywords: retail payments; merchants; costs; two-sided markets; competition; pricing; surcharging;

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References

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  1. Jacob A. Bikker & Sherrill Shaffer & Laura Spierdijk, 2009. "Assessing Competition with the Panzar-Rosse Model: The Role of Scale, Costs, and Equilibrium," CAMA Working Papers 2009-27, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  2. Julian Wright, 2004. "The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 1-26, 03.
  3. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, 06.
  4. Nicole Jonker, 2007. "Payment Instruments as Perceived by Consumers – Results from a Household Survey," De Economist, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 271-303, September.
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  6. James McAndrews & Zhu Wang, 2008. "The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage," Research Working Paper RWP 08-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  7. Terri Bradford, 2008. "Developments in interchange fees in the United States and abroad," Payments System Research Briefing, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Apr.
  8. Santiago Carbó Valverde & Sujit Chakravorti & Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández, 2009. "Regulating two-sided markets: an empirical investigation," Working Paper Series WP-09-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  9. Baxter, William F, 1983. "Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 541-88, October.
  10. Loke Yiing Jia, 2007. "Determinants of Merchant Participation in Credit Card Payment Schemes," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(4), pages 1-21, December.
  11. Chakravorti Sujit, 2010. "Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and Evidence," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-28, June.
  12. Wilko Bolt & Sujit Chakravorti, 2008. "Economics of Payment Cards: A Status Report," DNB Working Papers 193, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  13. Carlos Arango & Varya Taylor, 2008. "Merchant Acceptance, Costs, and Perceptions of Retail Payments: A Canadian Survey," Discussion Papers 08-12, Bank of Canada.
  14. Wilko Bolt & Sujit Chakravorti, 2008. "Consumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media," DNB Working Papers 197, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
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  16. Monnet, Cyril & Roberds, William, 2008. "Optimal pricing of payment services," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1428-1440, November.
  17. Hans Brits & Carlo Winder, 2005. "Payments are no free lunch," DNB Occasional Studies 302, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  18. Wilko Bolt & Nicole Jonker & Corry van Renselaar, 2008. "Incentives at the counter: An empirical analysis of surcharging card payment and payment behaviour in the Netherlands," DNB Working Papers 196, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  19. Nicole Jonker & Anneke Kosse, 2009. "The impact of survey design on research outcomes: A case study of seven pilots measuring cash usage in the Netherlands," DNB Working Papers 221, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  20. Wright, Julian, 2003. "Optimal card payment systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 587-612, August.
  21. Schuh, Scott & Stavins, Joanna, 2010. "Why are (some) consumers (finally) writing fewer checks? The role of payment characteristics," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1745-1758, August.
  22. Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
  23. Wright Julian, 2010. "Why Do Merchants Accept Payment Cards?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 1-8, August.
  24. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics Of Payment Card Associations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 549-570, Winter.
  25. Fumiko Hayashi, 2004. "A puzzle of card payment pricing : why are merchants still accepting card payments?," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wismer, Sebastian, 2013. "Intermediated vs. Direct Sales and a No-Discrimination Rule," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79999, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Nicole Jonker, 2013. "Social costs of POS payments in the Netherlands 2002-2012: Efficiency gains from increased debit card usage," DNB Occasional Studies 1102, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  3. Pyykko, Elina, 2011. "Review of the Payment Services Directive: The question of surcharges," ECRI Papers 6290, Centre for European Policy Studies.

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