Public versus Private Information
AbstractUsing the model by Morris and Shin (2002), we distinguish between how people perceive a state and how they act upon it. We show than even for perceptions, where the coordination motive plays no role, improving the quality of public information does not always reduce the forecasting error. The reason why this happens is because better information is always more relevant information. But if improvements in information attract more attention than they deserve, the overall effect may be detrimental to the accuracy of perceptions. Increases in private information quality, on the other hand, are always beneficial to the decisions. Moreover, the assumption of no private information error on average implies that agents would do better collectively if there was no public information signal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 290.
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Signal extraction; Public and Private information; Actions vs Perceptions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-06-11 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2011-06-11 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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