Monetary Policy Committees: meetings and outcomes
AbstractMonetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre-prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. (
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 184.
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
monetary policy committee; voting; Bank of England; Federal Open Market Committee;
Other versions of this item:
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-11-11 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MON-2008-11-11 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2005. "The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 23(S1), pages 37-82, October.
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2009. "Communication in a monetary policy committee: a note," DNB Working Papers 226, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Wojciech Charemza & Daniel Ladley, 2012. "MPC Voting, Forecasting and Inflation," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/23, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2013.
- Berk, Jan Marc & Bierut, Beata K., 2011. "Communication in a monetary policy committee," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 791-801.
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