How do Expenditure Rules affect Fiscal Behaviour?
AbstractThis paper investigates the role of self-enforced national expenditure rules in limiting the expenditure bias and procyclical expenditure increases/decreases due to revenue windfalls/shortfalls. A simple model predicts that expenditure rules can have the intended effects, but only if the political and institutional costs of non compliance are sufficiently large. Empirical estimations provide some support that expenditure rules affect expenditure outcomes in the hypothesised manner, especially when there are revenue shortfalls. We cannot disentangle, however, whether our results reflect a causal effect of expenditure rules on expenditure outcomes, or whether they are driven by a third variable of political preferences for addressing high expenditure to GDP ratios.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 166.
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-02-23 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2008-02-23 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-02-23 (Public Economics)
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