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Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and practices

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Author Info
Donato Masciandaro
Maria Nieto
Henriette Prast
Abstract

This paper focuses on the financing of banking supervision. Countries are classified according to who finances banking supervision – the tax payer and/or the supervised industry -, and how the budget and fees are determined. We show that funding regimes differ across countries. Public funding is more often found when banks are supervised by the central bank, while supervision funded via a levy on the regulated banks is more likely in the case of a separate financial authority. Finally, some countries apply mixed funding. In general, there is a trend toward more private funding. We also find a relation between sources of financing and accountability arrangements. Public financing is associated with accountability towards the parliament, while private financing is more likely to go hand in hand with accountability towards the government. The financing issue is important because the financing regime may affect the behaviour of the supervisor and hence the quality of supervision. Regulatory capture, industry capture and the supervisor's self interest may affect supervisory policy. No theoretical model has been developed prescribing the optimal financing of supervision. Our results suggest that the actual choice of financing is a casual one, not based on either considerations of incentive-compatability or on the beneficiary approach. As it is to be expected that financial regulation will become more internationally organized in the future, careful analysis of the financing issue will become even more relevant.

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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 141.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:141

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Related research
Keywords: banking supervision budgetary independence accountability financial governance central banks financial authorities.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000470, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rafael Repullo, 2000. "Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
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  6. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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