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On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting

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Author Info
Wilko Bolt
Alexander Tieman

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Abstract

We derive a stationary equilibrium in a two-player multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. At each stage, the probability to reach the next stage is determined by the players’ current actions. We assume that the players are myopic in the sense that they take the future strategies of their opponents as given. We find that the stationary myopic equilibrium of the infinite-horizon multi-stage game corresponds to the infinite repetition of a Nash equilibrium of an induced (one-shot) limit game. Interestingly, this stationary myopic equilibrium is singled out when studying limiting equilibria of the associated multi-stage game with a finite horizon.

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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 070.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:070

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Related research
Keywords: dynamic game; myopic equlibrium; discounting; equilibrium selection.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hausken, Kjell, 2005. "The battle of the sexes when the future is important," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 89-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. W. Bolt & A. F. Tieman, 2001. "Banking competition, risk, and regulation," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 647, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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