This paper examines the efficiency and practicality of airport slot constraints using a deterministic bottleneck model of landing and takeoff queues. It adapts this congestion pricing model to determine the optimal timing and quantity of slot permits for any number of slot windows. Aircraft choose their optimal operating times subject to the slot constraints, and airport queues adjust endogenously. The number and length of slot windows affects the congestion levels and efficiency gains. The atomistic bottleneck model is extended to include self-internalizing dominant traffic and atomistic fringe traffic. The model raises questions about the implementation of slot constraints that do not arise in standard congestion models. The theory explains Daniel's (2009a) empirical findings that slot-constraints at Toronto are ineffective and suggests that recent proposals for slot constraints at US airports would be similarly ineffective. Effective slot constraints require many narrow slot windows, making slot auctions or markets difficult to implement.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Delaware, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
09-09.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000.
"Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey,"
Discussion Papers
1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]