This paper investigates the conditions under which dominant airlines internalize self-imposed delays in a deterministic bottleneck model of airport congestion, complementing Brueckner and Van Dender's (2008) similar analysis for the standard congestion-pricing model. A unified model of congestion tolling includes untolled, uniform-, coarse-, multi-step, and fine-toll equilibria as specific cases. It provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for Daniel's (1995, 2008) empirical findings that dominant airlines often ignore self-imposed delays, by modeling three motivations for atomistic behavior: preempting potential entry by additional fringe aircraft; occupying higher valued service periods; and displacing actual fringe entrants that have more dispersed operating-time preferences. In each case, atomistic behavior generates queues that deter fringe operations. Unlike Daniel’s stochastic bottleneck model, this deterministic model provides explicit closed-form solutions for optimal tolls. Dominant and fringe tolls generally differ by constant amounts (if at all) rather than varying in inverse proportion to market share as in Brueckner and Van Dender's model.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Delaware, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
09-08.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1990.
"Economics of a bottleneck,"
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 111-130, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: