Analysis of the factors determining rates of economic growth has found that country-specific characteristics have important effects on growth performance. Empirical evidence to date suggests that maintenance of the rule of law promotes growth, while adopting democratic institutions does not appear to improve growth performance. We find that these conclusions are very sensitive to sample selection and to estimation technique. When an identical sample of countries is used, we find that countries with democratic institutions do enjoy superior growth performance. The relationship between growth and democratic institutions is also sensitive to the estimation technique used. Estimates using instrumental variable techniques suggest that democratic institutions do experience better growth performance. These results are especially relevant for developing nations. Length pages: 25 pages
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Paper provided by University of Delaware, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
04-03.
Length: Date of creation: 2004 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Economic Modeling, Vol 23. pp. 648-661, 2006 Handle: RePEc:dlw:wpaper:04-03
Find related papers by JEL classification: O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993.
"Corruption,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993.
"Corruption,"
NBER Working Papers
4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)