Building Social Networks

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Building Social Networks

Author Info

Robert P. Gilles
Sudipta Sarangi

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Sudipta Sarangi

Abstract

We examine the process of building social relationships as a non-cooperative game that requires mutual consent and involves reaching out to others at a cost. Players create their social network from amongst their set of acquaintances. Having acquaintances allows players to form naive beliefs about the feasibility of building direct relationships with their acquaintances. These myopic beliefs describe how the other players are expected to respond to the initiation of a link by a player. We introduce a stability concept called "monadic stability" where agents play a best response to their formed myopic beliefs such that these beliefs are self-confirming. The resulting equilibrium networks form subset of the set of pairwise stable networks.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 642.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 28 p.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp642

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Mohrenstra�e 58, D-10117 Berlin
Phone: xx49-30-89789-0
Fax: xx49-30-89789-200
Email:
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Bibliothek).

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-11-18 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2006-11-18 (Game Theory)
NEP-NET-2006-11-18 (Network Economics)
NEP-SOC-2006-11-18 (Social Norms & Social Capital)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2004. "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 387-411, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2001. "Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks," Working Papers 443, Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Sudipta Sarangi & Robert P. Gilles, . "Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs," Departmental Working Papers 2005-13, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Gilles, Robert P. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Stable networks and convex payoffs," Discussion Paper 84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2000. "On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0778, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Slikker, M. & Nouweland, A. van den, 1999. "Network formation models with costs for establishing links," Research Memorandum 771, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social network formation with consent," Discussion Paper 70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dutta, B. & Nouweland, A. van den & Tijs, S., 1995. "Link Formation in Cooperative Situations," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew O., 2007. "The formation of networks with transfers among players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 83-110, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players," Working Papers 1194, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Francis Bloch, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players," Working Papers 2004.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2008. "Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 335-345, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles, 2007. "Network potentials," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 13-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.