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The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Insurance: Lessons from the Failure of a Proposed Compulsory Insurance Scheme in Germany

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  • Reimund Schwarze
  • Gert G. Wagner

Abstract

This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such scheme and outlines the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political down-turn of this proposal were the misperceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the Ger-man states (Länder) on the implied administrative costs, and the well-known charity hazard of ad-hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy for policy advice in this field.

Suggested Citation

  • Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, 2006. "The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Insurance: Lessons from the Failure of a Proposed Compulsory Insurance Scheme in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 620, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp620
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1994. "A Theory of the Welfare State," CESifo Working Paper Series 65, CESifo.
    2. Ungern-Sternberg Thomas von, 2001. "Die Vorteile des Staatsmonopols in der Gebäudeversicherung: Erfahrungen aus Deutschland und der Schweiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 31-44, February.
    3. Reimund Schwarze & Gert G Wagner, 2004. "In the Aftermath of Dresden: New Directions in German Flood Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 29(2), pages 154-168, April.
    4. Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, 2002. "Hochwasserkatastrophe in Deutschland: über Soforthilfen hinausdenken," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 69(35), pages 596-600.
    5. Browne, Mark J & Hoyt, Robert E, 2000. "The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 291-306, May.
    6. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. " A Theory of the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 495-526, December.
    7. Thomas Von Ungern‐Sternberg, 2001. "Die Vorteile des Staatsmonopols in der Gebäudeversicherung: Erfahrungen aus Deutschland und der Schweiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(1), pages 31-44, February.
    8. Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, 2003. "Marktkonforme Versicherungspflicht für Naturkatastrophen: Bausteine einer Elementarschadenversicherung," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 70(12), pages 183-189.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Céline Grislain-Letrémy, 2018. "Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 129, pages 53-83.
    2. Yildiz, Özgür, 2014. "Lehren aus der Verhaltensökonomik für die Gestaltung umweltpolitischer Maßnahmen [Lessons from behavioral economics for the design of environmental policy measures]," MPRA Paper 59360, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. S. Surminski & J. Aerts & W. Botzen & P. Hudson & J. Mysiak & C. Pérez-Blanco, 2015. "Reflections on the current debate on how to link flood insurance and disaster risk reduction in the European Union," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 79(3), pages 1451-1479, December.
    4. Christian Kuhlicke & Anna Scolobig & Sue Tapsell & Annett Steinführer & Bruna Marchi, 2011. "Contextualizing social vulnerability: findings from case studies across Europe," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 58(2), pages 789-810, August.
    5. Karina Mužáková, 2014. "Optimal Model Financial Solutions Realization Of Natural Disasters In The Czech Republic," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 8(1), pages 911-935.
    6. Swenja Surminski & Paul Hudson & Jeroen Aerts & Wouter Botzen & M.Conceição Colaço & Florence Crick & Jill Eldridge & Anna Lorant & António Macedo & Reinhard Mechler & Carlos Neto & Robin Nicolai & Di, 2015. "Novel and improved insurance instruments for risk reduction," GRI Working Papers 188, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    7. Donatella Porrini & Reimund Schwarze, 2014. "Insurance models and European climate change policies: an assessment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 7-28, August.
    8. Beck, Silke & Kuhlicke, Christian & Görg, Christoph, 2009. "Climate policy integration, coherence, and governance in Germany. PEER Climate Change Initiative - Project 2: "Climate policy integration, coherence, and governance"," UFZ Reports 01/2009, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ).
    9. Heidi Kreibich & Philip Bubeck & Michael Kunz & Holger Mahlke & Stefano Parolai & Bijan Khazai & James Daniell & Tobia Lakes & Kai Schröter, 2014. "A review of multiple natural hazards and risks in Germany," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 74(3), pages 2279-2304, December.
    10. E. Keskitalo & Gregor Vulturius & Peter Scholten, 2014. "Adaptation to climate change in the insurance sector: examples from the UK, Germany and the Netherlands," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 71(1), pages 315-334, March.
    11. Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, 2009. "Natural Hazards Insurance in Europe - Tailored Responses to Climate Change Needed," Working Papers 2009-06, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    12. Dannenberg, Astrid & Mennel, Tim & Osberghaus, Daniel & Sturm, Bodo, 2009. "The economics of adaptation to climate change: the case of Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13276 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Kristian Krieger, 2013. "The limits and variety of risk‐based governance: The case of flood management in Germany and England," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 236-257, June.
    15. Surminski, Swenja, 2014. "The role of insurance in reducing direct risk: the case of flood insurance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60764, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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