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Do Couples Bargain over Fertility?: Evidence Based on Child Preference Data

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  • Timo Hener

Abstract

Empirical literature has found evidence in favor of household bargaining models. In contrast to earlier tests that are limited to assignable private goods, we use child preference data in order to extend the empirical evidence on household bargaining to public household goods. In the empirical analysis, we exploit the different theoretical predictions for couples with heterogeneous and homogeneous preferences derived from household models. Our results indicate that couples bargain over fertility. Furthermore, we find that the ability to commit to household resource allocations depends on the gender of the partner with higher preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Timo Hener, 2010. "Do Couples Bargain over Fertility?: Evidence Based on Child Preference Data," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 323, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp323
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Klemm, 2012. "Job Security and Fertility: Evidence from German Reunification," Ruhr Economic Papers 0379, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 943-961, July.
    3. Fabian Kindermann & Matthias Doepke, 2014. "Bargaining over Babies," 2014 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Fan Elliott & Maitra Pushkar, 2013. "Women Rule: Preferences and Fertility in Australian Households," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-30, April.
    5. Abir, Raphael & Boll, Christina & Bonin, Holger & Gerlach, Irene & Hank, Karsten & Laß, Inga & Nehrkorn-Ludwig, Marc-André & Reich, Nora & Reuß, Karsten & Schnabel, Reinhold & Stichnoth, Holger & Wilk, 2014. "Evaluation der Wirkung ehe- und familienbezogener Leistungen auf die Geburtenrate/Erfüllung von Kinderwünschen. Endbericht. Gutachten für die Prognos AG," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 110573.
    6. Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2015. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(1), pages 220-247, January.
    7. Klemm, Marcus, 2012. "Job Security and Fertility: Evidence from German Reunification," Ruhr Economic Papers 379, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    8. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-192, June.
    9. repec:zbw:rwirep:0379 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2014. "Pension and the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 8479, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Christos Bagavos, 2017. "Do different educational pairings lead to different fertility outcomes? A cohort perspective for the Greek case," Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, Vienna Institute of Demography (VID) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, vol. 15(1), pages 215-237.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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