Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Do Politicians Serve the One Percent? Evidence in OECD Countries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Torija, P.

Abstract

Present social movements, as "Occupy Wall Street" or the Spanish "Indignados", claim that politicians work for an economic elite, the 1%, that drives the world economic policies. In this paper we show through econometric analysis that these movements are accurate: politicians in OECD countries maximize the happiness of the economic elite. In 2009 center-right parties maximized the happiness of the 100th-98th richest percentile and center-left parties the 100th-95th richest percentile. The situation has evolved from the seventies when politicians represented, approximately, the median voter.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/2114/1/CITYPERC%2DWPS%2D2013_04.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of International Politics, City University London in its series CITYPERC Working Paper Series with number 2013-04.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dip:dpaper:2013-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of International Politics, Social Sciences Building, City University London, Whiskin Street, London, EC1R 0JD, United Kingdom
Phone: +44 (0)20 7040 8500
Email:
Web page: http://www.city.ac.uk/arts-social-sciences/international-politics/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Charles Revelle & David Marks & Jon C. Liebman, 1970. "An Analysis of Private and Public Sector Location Models," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(11), pages 692-707, July.
  2. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19726, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2006. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis," KOF Working papers 06-123, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  4. Prat, Andrea & Strömberg, David, 2011. "The Political Economy of Mass Media," CEPR Discussion Papers 8246, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2001. "Endogenous Lobbying," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2004.
  6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  7. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
  8. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 2006. "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Chris Edmond, 2011. "Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 17395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2010. "Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from US States," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-08, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  11. Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 105-124, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Inequality, evolution & complexity
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2013-03-22 15:04:39
  2. 'Inequality, Evolution, & Complexity'
    by Mark Thoma in Economist's View on 2013-03-22 17:59:55
  3. Who cares about the median voter? Not the politicians, maybe
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-04-05 15:26:00
  4. Radical Centrism: Uniting the Radical Left and the Radical Right
    by Ashwin in Macroeconomic Resilience on 2013-04-08 13:54:59
  5. Age, luck & unearned privilege
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2013-05-01 13:23:22

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dip:dpaper:2013-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Research Publications Librarian).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.