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La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau

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  • Christine Marsal

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

(VF)S’il est courant d’opposer capital financier et capital humain les organisations mettent en place des mécanismes de coordination afin de faire converger les intérêts des deux catégories de partenaires que sont les salariés et les actionnaires. La théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle permet de fournir un cadre d’analyse pertinent pour rendre compte de ces mécanismes. Dans ce cadre nous pouvons constater la pluralité des mécanismes d’incitation. Parmi eux, les incitations financières et le pouvoir de délégation accordé au niveau local figurent en bonne place. Ce qui garantit l’efficacité de ces mécanismes est la complémentarité et la cohérence des différentes composantes de l’architecture organisationnelle. Nous illustrons notre propos par une étude conduite dans le secteur bancaire français.(VA)If financial and human capital are commonly opposed, organization internal coordination used to align both employee and stockholder interest. Organizational architecure theory provides a conceptual framework to study thoses mecanisms. In this framework, we can notice incitative plurality mecanisms. We particularly study financial compensation and decision right allocation. Value creation comes from complemenarity between thoses mecanisms, an illustration is given in french retail banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Marsal, 2006. "La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau," Working Papers CREGO 1060501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1060501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incitations financières; marge de manœuvre; pouvoir de délégation; capital humain; capital financier; banques de réseau; architecture organisationnelle.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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