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Political contributions to influence consumers: the example of the u.s. drug reimportation debate

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  • Anne Boring

    ()
    (Université Paris-Dauphine, LEDa, IRD, UMR225-DIAL, Paris)

Abstract

To reduce pharmaceutical prices, some legislators have been trying to pass bills authorizing the reimportation of prescription drugs to the United States. Pharmaceutical companies oppose reimportation, by elaborating a message (foreign drugs are of lower quality than domestic drugs) to influence legislators and their constituents. The industry gives contributions to legislators to spread its anti-reimportation message. The amount it gives depends on legislators’ and constituents’ characteristics. The legislators who receive the most are those whose constituents are most likely to oppose reimports. _________________________________ Afin de réduire les prix des produits pharmaceutiques, des législateurs tentent depuis plusieurs années de faire passer des lois qui autoriseraient la ré-importation de médicaments aux Etats-Unis. Les entreprises pharmaceutiques s’opposent aux ré-importations en élaborant un argument pour influencer les législateurs et leurs électeurs. Ici, l’argument est que les médicaments vendus à l’étranger sont de moins bonne qualité que ceux vendus aux Etats- Unis. L’industrie pharmaceutique finance les législateurs américains pour diffuser ce message contre les ré-importations. Le montant qu’elle donne dépend des caractéristiques des législateurs et de leurs électeurs. Les législateurs qui reçoivent le plus de financement sont ceux dont les électeurs ont le plus de chances d’être opposés aux ré-importations.

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Paper provided by DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation) in its series Working Papers with number DT/2010/03.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201003

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Keywords: political contributions; lobbying; drug reimportation; pharmaceutical industry; protectionism; financement politique; lobbying; ré-importations; médicaments; industrie pharmaceutique; protectionnisme.;

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