Committee structure and its implications for monetary policy decision-making
AbstractWe investigate the implications for the setting of interest rates when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the committee and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote unanimously ex post. We allow for different committee sizes, various voting rules and differences in skills among committee members. We find that the size of the committee is much less important in determining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committee members. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minor effect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided that members on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using a simple majority rule. If either of these assumptions are relaxed, prior interaction has substantial effects on the setting of interest rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics in its series Serie Research Memoranda with number 0006.
Date of creation: 2003
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monetary policy; interest rates;
Other versions of this item:
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2003. "Committee structure and its implications for Monetary policy decision-making," MEB Series (discontinued) 2003-05, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2003. "Committee Structure and its Implications for Monetary Policy Decision-making," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-053/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-05-29 (All new papers)
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