An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics in its series Serie Research Memoranda with number 0015.
Date of creation: 1993
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- Houba, Harold, 1993. "An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 253-256.
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- Harold Houba, 2005. "Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-063/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003.
"Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
- Houba, Harold, 1997. "The policy bargaining model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, August.
- Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2000. "Bargaining with asymmetric threat points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 333-339, December.
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