Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
AbstractThe novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default behavior. The individual believed return depends on how many neighbors an agent has, how many of those neighbors already adopted the new behavior and some agent-specic cost-benefit parameter. There are four main insights of our model: (1) A variety of collective adoption behaviors is determined by the network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of adoption which ensures the new behavior to prevail. (4) Equilibria and dynamic be- havior changes as we change the underlying network and other parameters. Given the complexity of the system we use a standard technique for estimating the solution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 13-208/II.
Date of creation: 20 Dec 2013
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Diffusion; Social Networks; Social Learning; Tipping; Technology Adoption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
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- Kuran, Timur, 1991. "The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising That We Were Surprised?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 121-25, May.
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