The Prediction Value
AbstractWe introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues – including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value – can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 13-188/II.
Date of creation: 25 Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl
influence; voting games; cooperative games; Banzhaf value; Shapley value;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2011.
"Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
11018, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- René Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2013. "Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 671-683, September.
- Rene van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2011. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 11-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- René Van Den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2011. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders : An Axiomatization," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00587726, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.