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The Political Economy of Finance

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  • Enrico Perotti

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial structure, such as the Great Reversal in the early XX century, unlike time-invariant legal institutions or cultural traits. Future research should model the sources and consequences of financial instability, and to predict how major redistributive shocks will shape regulatory choices and financial governance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 13-034/IV/DSF53.

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Date of creation: 25 Feb 2013
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20130034

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: political institutions; property rights; investor protection; financial development; access to finance; entry; banking;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Degryse, Hans & Lambert, Thomas & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2013. "The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 9621, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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