The Political Economy of Finance
AbstractThis survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial structure, such as the Great Reversal in the early XX century, unlike time-invariant legal institutions or cultural traits. Future research should model the sources and consequences of financial instability, and to predict how major redistributive shocks will shape regulatory choices and financial governance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 13-034/IV/DSF53.
Date of creation: 25 Feb 2013
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political institutions; property rights; investor protection; financial development; access to finance; entry; banking;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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