Financial Frictions and the Credit Transmission Channel: Capital Requirements and Bank Capital
AbstractWe investigate actual capital chosen by banks in presence of capital minimum requirements and ex-post penalties for violating them. The model yields excess capital that is always positive and increases during times of distress in the economy, which is in line with empirical evidence. Next, we show that in presence of ex-post violation penalties the introduction of the conservation buffer under Basel III will not contribute to lowering the pro-cyclicality of capital regulations. The countercyclical buffer proposed under Basel III is then even more desirable as it significantly attenuates fluctuations of actual capital also when the penalties are accounted for.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 13-013/VI/DSF50.
Date of creation: 14 Jan 2013
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capital requirements; Basel regulatory framework; excess capital; countercyclical buffer; market discipline;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-01-26 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-01-26 (Central Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2013-01-26 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-RMG-2013-01-26 (Risk Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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