Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games
AbstractA (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-136/II.
Date of creation: 07 Dec 2012
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TU-game; equal division solution; CIS-value; ENSC-value; population solidarity; consistency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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