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Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games

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Author Info

  • Rene van den Brink

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Youngsub Chun

    (Seoul National University)

  • Yukihiko Funaki

    (Waseda University)

  • Boram Park

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-136/II.

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Date of creation: 07 Dec 2012
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120136

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: TU-game; equal division solution; CIS-value; ENSC-value; population solidarity; consistency;

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References

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  1. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp421, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  2. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2013. "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 693-714, March.
  3. van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
  4. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
  5. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2004-50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
  7. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2012. "Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 255-270, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2013. "Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?," Working Papers, CRESE 2013-09, CRESE.

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