Tax Rates as Strategic Substitutes
AbstractThis paper analytically derives the conditions under which the slope of the tax reaction function is negative in a classical tax competition model. If countries maximize welfare, we show that a negative slope (reflecting strategic substitutability) occurs under relatively mild conditions. Simulations suggest that strategic substitutability occurs under plausible parameter configurations. The strategic tax response is crucial for understanding tax competition games, as well as for assessing the welfare effects of partial tax unions (whereby a subset of countries coordinate their tax rates). Indeed, contrary to earlier findings that have assumed strategic complementarity in tax rates, we show that partial tax unions might reduce welfare under strategic substitutability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-104/VI.
Date of creation: 02 Oct 2012
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Strategic Substitutes; Asymmetry; Strategic Tax Response; Tax Coordination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2012-10-13 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-10-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-10-13 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010.
"Enhanced Coorporation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition,"
1002, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. De Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 2915, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-011/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2005. "Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 258-274, March.
- Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
- repec:wop:syecwp:9713 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Ziad, Abderrahmanne, 2005. "Existence of equilibria in a basic tax-competition model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, January.
- Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2011. "On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 439-445, September.
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