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On the Merits of Meritocracy

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  • John Morgan

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Dana Sisak

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Felix Vardy

    (University of California, Berkeley and IMF)

Abstract

We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-077/1.

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Date of creation: 20 Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120077

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: career choice; promotion competition; selection; meritocracy;

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  1. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2011. "The lifeboat problem," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-106, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  2. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management," CESifo Working Paper Series 2437, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
  4. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2009. "Competition among contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 743-768.
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