Networks and Collective Action
AbstractThis paper proposes a new measure for a group's ability to lead society to adopt their standard of behavior, which in particular takes account of the time the group takes to convince the whole society to adopt their position. This notion of a group's power to initiate action is computed as the reciprocal of the resistance against it, which is in turn given by the expected absorption time of a related finite state partial Markov chain that captures the social dynamics. The measure is applicable and meaningful in a variety of models where interaction between agents is formalized through (weighted) binary relations. Using Percolation Theory, it is shown that the group power is monotonic as a function of groups of agents. We also explain the differences between our measure and those discussed in the literature on Graph Theory, and illustrate all these concerns by a thorough analysis of two particular cases: the Wolfe Primate Data and the 11S hijackers' network.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-032/1.
Date of creation: 29 Mar 2012
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Collective action; Social networks; Influence and diffusion models; Network intervention; Group centrality measures;
Other versions of this item:
- Ramón Jesús Flores Díaz & Maurice Koster & Ines Lindner & Elisenda Molina, 2010. "Networks and collective action," Statistics and Econometrics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de EstadÃstica y EconometrÃa ws104830, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Estadística y Econometría.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-10 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2012-04-10 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-04-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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