On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction
AbstractThe main purpose of the present paper is to disentangle the mix-up of the notions of success and satisfaction which is prevailing in the voting power literature. We demonstrate that both notions are conceptually distinct, and discuss their relationship and measurement. We show that satisfaction contains success as one component, and that both coincide under the canonical set-up of a simultaneous decision-making mechanism as it is predominant in the voting power literature. However, we provide two examples of sequential decision-making mechanisms in order to illustrate the difference between success and satisfaction. In the context of the discussion of both notions we also address their relationship to different types of luck.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-030/1.
Date of creation: 27 Mar 2012
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success; satisfaction; luck; power;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-09-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-09-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HAP-2012-09-16 (Economics of Happiness)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Axiomatizations of a Positional Power Score and Measure for Hierarchies,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
08-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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- repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00756720 is not listed on IDEAS
- René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2011.
"Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
11018, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- René Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2013. "Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 671-683, September.
- Rene van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2011. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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