Confirming Information Flows in Networks
AbstractSocial networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. In many networks agents will value confirmation of the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the impact such a need for confirmation has on the social networks which are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-019/1.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2012
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connections model; confirmation; two-way flow models;
Other versions of this item:
- Billand, P. & Bravard, C. & Kamphorst, J. & Sarangi, S., 2013. "Confirming information flows in networks," Working Papers 2013-06, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2013. "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," MPRA Paper 45835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jurjen Kamphorst, . "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2012-02, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-08-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-08-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2012-08-23 (Network Economics)
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