A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover
AbstractIn this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 12-012/1.
Date of creation: 10 Feb 2012
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Cooperative game theory; compromise admissible games; bankruptcy; core cover; complexity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Zwikker, P., 2004.
"Compromise Solutions Based on Bankruptcy,"
2004-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Quant, M. & Gonzalez-Diaz, J., 2003. "A Geometric Characterisation of the Compromise Value," Discussion Paper 2003-88, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Platz, T.T. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Quant, M., 2011. "Characterizing Compromise Stability of Games Using Larginal Vectors," Discussion Paper 2011-058, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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