The Institutional Economics of Stakeholder Consultation; Reducing Implementations Costs through 'Matching Zones'
AbstractThis paper discusses various ways to organise these consultations, so that a compromise agreement is reached on the solution of the (re)distribution problem. These institutionalised structures of consultation are referred to as 'matching zones' here. Practical experiences, mainly from the Netherlands, provide guidelines for the effective institutional setup of such 'matching zones'. Specifically, the design of a 'matching zone' should try to adhere to the following principles: (i) there should be a common interest and ample incentives for consensus; (ii) there should be the prospect of long, repeated interaction; (iii) there should be a balance between representation and efficiency; (iv) the constraints should be clear from the onset of the matching zone; (v) fairness should be strived for; (vi) IC technology should be utilised optimally; and (viii) informal contacts and an amicable atmosphere should be promoted.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 11-162/3.
Date of creation: 15 Nov 2011
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Institutional economics; G2B and G2C relationship; public-private cooperation; transaction costs; regulatory pressure; matching zone;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-21 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Butter, Frank A.G. den & Mosch, Robert H.J., 2001.
"the Dutch miracle: institutions, networks and trust,"
Serie Research Memoranda
0018, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Frank A.G. den Butter & Robert H.J. Mosch, 2003. "The Dutch Miracle: Institutions, Networks, and Trust," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 362-, June.
- R. Isaac & Deborah Mathieu & Edward Zajac, 1991. "Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 329-370, September.
- Frank A.G. den Butter, 2010. "Transaction Management: Value Creation by Reducing Transaction Costs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-051/3, Tinbergen Institute.
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